



HWA CHONG INSTITUTION (HIGH SCHOOL SECTION)

CATEGORY 2A PROJECT: WRITTEN REPORT 2018

Topic: Resolving the Korean Conflict: Historical Perspectives from the North and the South

Slant: History

Total Word Count (excluding appendixes, footnotes & references): 4399

Students' (official) Name: Koh Zhi-Xuan (L), Lim Cheng Xi Joel

Class: 3H1


Group No.: 2-23

Name of Teacher-Mentor: Mr Eugene Chua Yoong Tching

Declaration

I declare that this assignment is my own work and does not involve plagiarism or collusion. The sources of other people's work have been appropriately referenced, failing which I am willing to accept the necessary disciplinary action(s) to be taken against me.

Student's Signature :



Date of Submission: 16/8/2018

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Background

From the Japanese occupation of Korea till now, the Korean Peninsula has not experienced peace for more than a century. Despite an armistice being signed in 1953, the two Koreas are technically still at war, both ideologically and literally. Relations between them have been characterised by occasional border conflicts, frequent military games by the South and nuclear tests by the North. Past and current administrations have tried to de-nuclearise the North via diplomatic engagement, military action and economic sanctions.

In the tumultuous history of the Koreas, the Sunshine Policy initiated by the Kim Dae-Sung administration of the ROK started a period of diplomatic engagement from 1993 to 2010 broke the military standstill. Its eventual failure continued the cycle of mutual assured destruction between North Korea and its opponents. The Sunshine Policy may offer us some lessons to answer an important question towards resolving the Korean Conflict: is diplomacy, war, or continuing to sanction North Korea the best way?

1.2 Rationale

The Korean Conflict has been a problem plaguing the Korean Peninsula for decades and this issue has mostly been analysed in the interests of South Korea and the United States, if not purely sympathising with North Korea. This paper would like to offer a balanced perspective on this topic by looking at the Korean Conflict in the lens of both Koreas. North Korea's volatile and complex behaviour needs to be broken down to understand its needs and South Korea's practical interests have to be considered in formulating policies towards successfully resolving the conflict. Therefore this paper draws in the theory of coercive diplomacy framed by

Alexander George to view North Korea's nuclear development as a policymaker than an aggressor; and the theory of political realism to identify the South's concerns.

1.3 Research Questions

1. What are the stances of both Koreas on the conflict?
2. With reference to the case study of the Sunshine Policy,
 - a. And the branch of political realism in the International Relations Theory, why did South Korea initiate such a policy?
 - b. And the theory of coercive diplomacy, why does North Korea pursue an aggressive military and nuclear strategy?
3. How far would a non-aggressive approach resolve the Korean conflict as compared to aggressive strategies?

1.4 Thesis Statement

Continued non-aggressive engagement with North Korea will yield more peaceful results because:

- a) isolation and pressure has led to her hostile military strategy, and
- b) it will secure South Korea's national interests.

1.5 Delimitations

This paper will look at the implementation of the Sunshine Policy from 1998 to 2010 specifically. The justification is that all three approaches of conflict resolution is simultaneously employed within this time period of time, which allows for a fair evaluation of which approach is the most beneficial for the South and to induce positive reaction from the North.

1.6 Significance

This research paper hopes to add value to the field of study on the Korean conflict and to present a nuanced and balanced opinion of the best approach towards resolving the conflict. It aims to analyse the Korean Conflict from the perspectives of both Koreas to understand the North's behaviour and the South's national interests so that policymakers can work towards a more rational approach considering the concerns of both sides.

1.7 Limitations

Relations between North Korea and South Korea and her allies are volatile and dynamic. Geopolitical relations are also ever-changing and this paper only focuses on the Sunshine Policy. Hence this paper may not be able to present changes in stances of the two Koreas due to recent developments.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Coercive Diplomacy (George, 1991)

The US intelligence community believes that North Korea's development of nuclear weapons were for "coercive purposes", with the intent to control the whole Korean Peninsula (Cohen, 2018). However in North Korea's perspective, nuclear arms are for the sole purpose of self-preservation. The theory of coercive diplomacy is useful to investigate the true motive of why North Korea resorts to such aggressive nuclear policy by analysing how the nuclear proliferation is being used as a coercive tool.

In the first chapter of Alexander L. George's (1991, pp. 3-14) *Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War*, the abstract concepts and theory of coercive diplomacy are identified:

Definition		A strategy of defensive intentions to persuade an opponent to cease or reverse an action already undertaken
Components of Variant		Demands of policymaker
		Time limit set/Sense of urgency for adversary
Types of Variant	Ultimatum	Demand made explicit Punishment is threatening, impactful Great sense of urgency for adversary, time limit can be tacit or explicit
	Gradual Turning of Screw	Demand made explicit Made clear from the start, that, punishment and pressure will escalate gradually Sense of urgency increases as severity of punishment increases
	"Try and See"	Demand made explicit Weak threat posed to adversary

		Adversary does not feel a great sense of urgency Policymaker waits to see whether adversary's compliance is achieved before deciding whether to continue strategy
Levels of Communication	Words/Verbal	
	Actions (ranges from military to political/diplomatic)	
The Carrot-and-Stick Approach in Coercive Diplomacy		Use of positive inducements and proposal to make concessions to achieve motive, while simultaneously using threats and punishment in the case of non-compliance

Fig 2.1: Abstract model of Coercive Diplomacy

In the third chapter of George's work, the contextual variables motivating the implementation of coercive diplomacy and affecting the type of variant used are drawn from a variety of case studies, and can be applied to another situation where coercive diplomacy is used.

1. Type of provocation	The severity of the provocation initiated by the adversary influences the variant the policymaker responds with.
2. Magnitude and depth of conflict of interests	When the policymaker is affected greatly by the conflict, it gives a motive to respond with coercive diplomacy. When both sides feel that the situation is of great importance, the possibility of success of coercive diplomacy is weakened.
3. Image of war	The more both parties are afraid of war, the greater the probability of achieving cooperation.
4. Time pressure to achieve objective	The greater the sense of urgency the provocative action initiated by the adversary is, the more likely the policymaker will issue an ultimatum.
5. Unilateral/Coalitional Coercive Diplomacy	Coercive diplomacy is usually harder when it is used by a coalition of states rather than a single party.
6. Strong leadership	The choice, execution and result of coercive diplomacy is dependent on the type of leadership.
7. Isolation of adversary	Coercive diplomacy is harder when the adversary is backed diplomatically and militarily by many other allies.

8. Preferred post crisis relationship with adversary	The magnitude of threat and the demand of the strategy is carried out in consideration of the ties between the two parties have after the crisis.
--	---

Fig 2.2: Contextual Variables affecting the variant and motivating the use coercive diplomacy. George (1991, pp. 69-72)

This research paper will be using the abstract model (Fig 2.1) to analyse the nuclear strategy of North Korea as one of coercive diplomacy and more importantly North Korea as the policymaker and its opponents as adversaries initiating provocations. Contextual variables will also be applied to understand the historical context and reasons for its development of nuclear weapons.

2.1.2 Realism in International Relations (Morgenthau, 1941)

Hans Morgenthau, the conceptualiser of the theory of realism, came up with 6 principles with regard to his theory, as listed in the table below. It is worth noting that many have concluded that his second theory is the main fundamental principle that defines his theory. This theory can be used to determine the the national interest of a certain country, of which in South Korea's perspective,their national interest would be to carry out diplomatic engagement as compared to other forms of conflict resolution.

6 Principles of Political Realism	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Politics is governed by Objective Laws which have roots in Human Nature 2. National Interest is always defined in terms of National Power 3. National Interest is always changing 4. Abstract Moral Principles cannot be applied to Politics 5. Difference between Moral Aspirations of a Nation and the Universal Moral Principles 6. Autonomy of International Politics
--	---

This research paper aims to make use of the necessary principles in the theory of political realism to justify the interests of South Korea.

2.2 Opinions on how to achieve nuclear non-proliferation on the Korean Peninsula

2.2.1 Arguments for and against military intervention

Arguments advocating military intervention propose for the state's nuclear arsenal to be destroyed. With North Korea making advancements in its ICBM tests in recent years, many fear that the security of South Korea and its allies will be threatened. Supporters for the use for military action claim that North Korea would not have the technology to retaliate directly against the United States, and feel that the South is not pressurizing enough on the increasingly aggressive nuclear state (Luttwak, 2018). Some also suggest that the United States take preemptive military measures such as short surgical strikes before North Korea crosses the nuclear threshold first, which could result in more nuclear contamination and destruction (Lam, 2018). Such views, however downplay the ability of North Korea to respond with other forms of military action, and only considers the security of the United States, without considering the possibility of the North taking revenge on the South.

In a world opposed to solutions using arms, most academics disagree with the use of any aggression because they speculate that the possible retaliation from North Korea may be too much for South Korea and Japan to bear (Stratfor, 2018). North Korea has sufficient military power to strike Seoul, the capital of South Korea, where half of its population resides (Carpenter,

2010). Hence, contrary to the views of the supporters of intervention, critics feel that the possible resultant collateral damage will be larger if North Korea strikes back.

2.2.3 Arguments for and against economic sanctions

Proponents of economic sanctions feel that they should be used extensively to threaten the economic survival of North Korea (Lee & Stanton, 2016). The state would then have insufficient funds to pay for its nuclear program and have no other choice but to accept negotiations with the US. However, the efficiency of economic sanctions is questionable if employed in this manner. If North Korea is open to talks only when its economy is at the brink of collapsing due to the sanctions, it may only be seeking temporary peace to momentarily free itself from the economic pressure exerted by its opponents, and subsequently when it acquires enough funds, go back to its provocative nuclear programme, resulting in a behavioural cycle of North Korea seeking talks when economic pressure is too much to bear and continue its nuclear programme, not aiding the existing deadlock. Some also suggest that the effects of sanctions are not yet seen because they are not implemented harshly enough. Masahiko (2011) attributes the weak nature of sanctions to its ambiguity and how entities can easily evade sanctions, while Lee & Stanton (2016) claim that the US has not applied sufficient economic pressure. One must consider however the impacts of tight and effective sanctions on North Korea.

Opponents of the general use of economic sanctions say that the damage dealt to the country's economy will affect the livelihoods of the innocent citizens more than the government (Whitty, Kim, & Crick, 2006, pp. 54). This is especially applicable to the case of North Korea, where the government controls the people strictly and regime collapse due to uprisings is unlikely, hence not motivating any behavioural change.

Since North Korea experiences economic pressure from these sanctions, this strategy may further worsen ties between the North and the South and give North Korea a reason to continue developing nuclear weapons (Kim & Martin-Hermosillo, 2013). Sanctions further isolate and pressurize it and may only aggravate antagonism between North Korea and the rest of the world, and it may reciprocate the hostility displayed through sanctions by carrying out nuclear tests, shown through its defiant rhetoric in the 2017.

Many are also dubious about the effectiveness of using sanctions against North Korea, considering its close economic ties with China. If the US continues to employ the strategy of economic sanctioning, it may find itself at odds with key stakeholders in the conflict such as China and South Korea, who are more inclined towards engagement with North Korea (Whitty, Kim, & Crick, 2006, pp. 59). China and Russia still maintain their economic activities with North Korea despite UN sanctions (Work, 2017), which shows that North Korea still has financial backing as sanctions try to starve the regime of money, highlighting the futility of sanctions.

2.2.2 Arguments for and against diplomatic engagement

Diplomatic engagement is claimed to be the only strategy that can achieve peace in the Korean Peninsula because of the fear of war (Carpenter, 2010). However, there are diverging opinions about how to use diplomacy to make North Korea stop its aggressive policies.

Cha (1999) suggests the use of conditional engagement. He argues that diplomatic engagement should be a stick-and-carrot approach, which gives North Korea economic incentives and subsequently threatens the state with the reinstatement of the punishment and termination of the previous incentives to motivate behavioural change. In the process, he also feels that deterrence

should be used simultaneously with engagement. However, the ineffectiveness and possible backfire of economic sanctions has been discussed in Chapter 2.2.

The arguments supporting unconditional engagement reflect on past historical examples when conditional engagement has failed.

The US has used diplomatic engagement as a bargaining chip like in conditional engagement in the 1990s, but it did not achieve peace in the Korean Peninsula. The strategy was defined as one of “crime and punishment” (Sigal, 1997). It involved pressuring North Korea to comply to its demands such as allowing nuclear inspections and only reward it with talks if they complied. Its failure was evidenced by North Korea’s withdrawal of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1994. Sigal (1997) believes that a strategy of cooperation instead of coercion would succeed, and that parties negotiating with North Korea must be willing to embrace give-and-take diplomacy-to meet some of North Korea’s needs.

Perry (2017) sees that a diplomatic strategy of negotiations and peaceful engagement implemented with sustained effort would yield the best results as North Korea’s primary objective is to have its security assured by the United States, instead of economic incentives.

2.3 Major Key stakeholders in the issues


In the Korean conflict, there are a few clear stakeholders in the general conflict. They incline towards helping either South Korea or North Korea due to strategic interests or long-lasting ties based on similar beliefs. The US shares a military alliance with South Korea, and have employed both military threats and engagement on the DPRK before. The US is also a strong advocate for economic sanctions on North Korea in the UN.

Though opposing North Korea's nuclear arms, China has extended economic help in the midst of international sanctions on North Korea. The USSR assisted North Korea in its early stages of nuclear development, but since its dissolution, Russia's stance in the conflict has been less inclined towards either party, and hence will not be examined in the Sunshine Policy.

Chapter 2.4 Conclusion of Literature Review

Current arguments for different strategies fail to base themselves in providing specific historical details about why they succeed or fail, with the exception of the proposition for diplomacy. The academic world seems to be inclined towards diplomacy as well. In subsequent chapters this paper will explore the best strategy with multi-faceted views through examining the historical context of the Sunshine Policy era.

Chapter 3: Methodology



In the discussion chapter, both stances of the two Koreas will be explored. Since South Korea's stance towards the issue is mostly constant, it will be examined together with the principles and main projects of the policies using Morgenthau's Six Principles of Political Realism in order to identify the reasons of the initiation of the Sunshine Policy and the main national interests South Korea wants to secure. However North Korea's stance is not clearly delineated from its frequent interchange between engagement and hostility. Hence its stance will be instead explored by analysing the 2009 Nuclear Test in the later days of the Sunshine Policy using George's theory

of coercive diplomacy. By investigating the contextual variables of the nuclear test, North Korea's reasons for playing with nuclear diplomacy and the national interests it wants to safeguard will be identified. An evaluation of the possible approaches as listed in Chapter 2 in this paper will be conducted based on the national interests and stances of both Koreas.

Chapter 4: Discussion and Analysis

4.1 South Korea's Stance in the Korean Conflict

South Korea has repeatedly been pushing for a gradual and peaceful unification (Park, 2014).

The Republic has always believed in making use of a market economy or its principles of liberal democracy to unify the Korean peninsula, with minimal use of military actions. “Peace first, unification after” has been the principle that South Korea has stood by (Park, 2014). In the search for the magic pill, South Korea has emphasised on communication and exchange.

South Korea's approach	Collaboration and appeasement
	A Korean Commonwealth
	A unified, “one nation, one state” Korea

Fig 2.1 (Park, 2014)

Particularly noteworthy would be the example of the National Community Unification Formula, where South Korea pledged, in 1989, that the reunification of the Korean peninsula was something high up on their priority list in President Park’s Administration. This suggests the significance of this issue to the South Koreans and their insistence on non-aggressive methods as the preferred means and method in solving the crisis. As such, it will definitely be in South Korea’s interests to solve this issue peacefully, in a non-aggressive manner.

4.2 Sunshine Policy initiated by South Korea

The Sunshine Policy was a South Korean Policy employed during the Kim Dae-Jung era which defined South Korea's policy and stance towards the North for two administrations. The gist of the policy was as such:

"no toleration of North Korean armed provocations, no South Korean efforts to undermine or absorb the North, and active ROK attempts to promote reconciliation and cooperation between the two Koreas."

(Levin & Han, 2002, p. 24)

Though South Korea would not tolerate military provocations, it did not underline denuclearisation as a precursor to negotiations. Instead, it provided security assurances and offered economic opportunities, resorting to an unconditional engagement policy rather than its coercive strategy. The economic aspect of normalisation was heavily emphasised on. The Kaesong Industrial Complex allowed for North Korea labour to work for South Korean companies (Manyin & Nanto, 2011), which was milestone for collaboration between the two. Two Inter-Korean Summits were also held in 2000 and 2007, indicating a thaw of tensions.

4.2.1 Reasons for such a policy

Rationale behind the Sunshine Policy	1. National Interest is always defined in terms of National Power
	2. National Interest is always changing
	3. Autonomy of International Politics

During the 1990s, when the Sunshine Policy was borned, South Korea was one of the fastest growing economy (Noland, 2011) and had surpassed North Korea's growth greatly, indicating a change of status in the conflict (Bolton, 2012). Since South Korea's interest also lay in ensuring

investor confidence in their country, they would have a active interest to prevent any forms of military attacks from the North as it will undermine their international reputation and cause investors to view them as an unstable country to invest in. The economic ability characterised South Korea's "national power", and could afford to use its economy as a negotiating tool. Thus, it would be in South Korea interest to use their economy to solve the issue as they know that they have a strong economy and such employing an economic strategy would cause the least damage to them. The strategic interest of South Korea was that North Korea was suffering from economic problems, going the opposite direction of the South's economy. To put this into context, throughout North Korea history, famines and food shortages have plagued the country's history, especially during Kim Jong-Il's era. An estimated 23 million people starved in the hands of this one man. (Weissman, 2011). Therefore, Kim Jong Il knew that he had to do something to salvage his reputation and maintain his control, to prevent regime collapse. Knowing that there was a possible change of national interest, Kim Dae-Jung, the president of South Korea, therefore, took this golden opportunity to provide the North with the resources they require and will treasure. In exchange, they would use this to their advantage and demand for leniency on their request like releasing the various South Korean detainees in the country. Therefore, they were able to exploit their monetary and economic 'prowess' to force North Korea into a compromise. South Korea wanted to work towards normalisation and give North Korea security assurances, through a soft approach and various forms of trade offs. However, the road to the sunshine policy was not a smooth sailing one. A main opposition to this policy was President Bush, the then president of the United States of America at that point of time. His stance was for hardline approach to this issue, where he wanted to ensure the denuclearisation and North

Korea's vow to uphold human rights (Stratfor, 2000). South Korea has rejected this notion because it may lead to war or a rushed reunification, which can cause a huge damage to their economy or even lead to a loss of lives. (Matray, 2005) As the sixth principle of political realism states that international politics is autonomous, thus, South Korea would not allow themselves to be controlled by their allies. Therefore, they were confident that they would be able to convince the North to compromise on this matter.

4.2.2 Conclusion

A reflection of South Korea's initiation of the policy reveals that it had practical security and economic interests to secure in the conflict, which led to it departing from the internationally agreed doctrine towards the DPRK. Its position as a growing economic power, the growing disparity between was an opportunity was it could capitalise on and gain leverage over North Korea.

4.3 Use of Military by North Korea during the Sunshine Policy Era

4.3.1 The 2009 North Korean Nuclear Test

DPRK was able to use its nuclear arsenal as a threat in its 4th phase of nuclear development (Bolton, 2012), resulting in the emergence of an era of assured retaliation (Bermudez, 2015). The DPRK conducted its second nuclear test by detonating an atomic bomb “as powerful as the Hiroshima bomb” underground. Fackler (2009) interprets the nuclear test as a message to North Korea’s own citizens, following a succession crisis after Kim Jong-Il suffered from a stroke in 2008. This section will expand the scope of this argument and explore the relation to its diplomatic strategy towards its opponents.

4.3.1.1 Characterisation of the 2009 Nuclear Test as a Variant

Type of Variant	Gradual-Turning-of-the-Screw
Component of Variant	Demands, Time Limit, Punishment: Not explicitly stated
Level of Communication	Action

As the second nuclear test, the state hints that its nuclear technology has been improving and that the probability of subsequent tests cannot be ruled out. The nuclear test does not accompany any state demands and its time limit, nor does it threaten any punishment, but the happening of a nuclear warfare is being insinuated by the North.

4.3.1.2 Context of the 2009 Nuclear Test

The provocation leading to North Korea having to resort to coercive nuclear diplomacy is, similar to Phase III, the inconsistency in engagement, this time however demonstrated by South Korea. In February 2008, North Korea saw Lee Myung-Bak assuming the role of President of the ROK. Lee's campaign rhetoric had revealed his differing political stand from previous administrations regarding the treatment of North Korea. The Kim Dae-Jung administration adhered to its Sunshine Policy since 1998, making improved inter-Korean relations via economic collaboration its primary goal (Paik, 2000). The succeeding Roh Moo-Hyun administration continued this doctrine and even established the Kaesong Industrial Park with North Korea in 2003, which was viewed as a milestone towards greater economic collaboration and normalisation of DPRK-ROK relations. However Lee's government defied the doctrine by pursuing an assertive and confrontational than collaborative foreign policy towards the North. The administration drafted a "De-Nuke, Open 3000" initiative, which pledged ROK assistance to North Korea to help it achieve a \$3,000 per capita income within 10 years in exchange for

denuclearisation. Lee demanded the denuclearisation before further expansion of economic activities at the Kaesong Industrial Complex as well. The return to the ROK-US-alliance-like style of conditional diplomacy with the DPRK having to give in first most likely triggered the 2009 Nuclear Test, with North Korea having to reassert military dominance to send the message that it was not trading its security assurances for the economic incentive that South Korea had offered, also hoping that with coercion the administration would fall back on the Sunshine Policy which it had favoured. It is also important to note that in 2009, Obama had also just assumed the presidency of the United States. In his campaign, Obama had already made clear his policy towards “rogue states” such as North Korea. Though distinctively different from the aggressive Bush administration, Obama’s policy still was not attractive to North Korea. His “strategic patience” doctrine was “tantamount to doing nothing” (Gard, 2013), while imposing economic sanctions and only opening to talks unless denuclearisation took place. The doctrines that the new administrations of North Korea’s two key opponents foreboded a consequent era of isolation and constant economic pressurization again, which it hoped to reverse by conducting the 2009 Nuclear Test.

Lee’s new government conflicted with North Korea’s interest to a large extent. The implemented Sunshine Policy took a pro-DPRK stance whereas Lee’s government intended to use economic development to gain leverage over DPRK’s nuclear development. The “De-Nuke, Open 3000” Initiative required North Korea to choose between its nuclear weapons or potential economic development, which changed North Korea’s authority in negotiations with South Korea from the past decade. The North’s time pressure to change the stand of Lee’s administration was not urgent, nor was it possible. North Korea’s intention of conducting the nuclear test was simply to

send a subtle message and warning that the North was not to be pushed too far, especially on the issue of denuclearisation, that it could not be forced into giving up its nuclear arsenal. As per the missile test in Phase III, the North intended to use the image of war to its own advantage. With estimates of the yield being around 5 times more than the previous test (Fedchenko, 2009), the second test amplifies the image of initiating an impending nuclear armageddon, which the West and the ROK wishes to avoid.

4.3.2 Conclusion of North Korea's Stance

By viewing the 2009 Nuclear Test as a variant of coercive diplomacy, it largely revealed the main national interests which was compromised by its opponents (viewed as the adversaries from the perspective of North Korea). North Korea uses its nuclear arsenal in hope of reversing certain policies which its opponents, such as the ROK and the USA, have implemented which is not in favour of its national interests. By contextualising the nuclear test as a response to the policies of two new administrations, it has been shown that North Korea values greater sincerity in engagement and consistency in approaches. It is unwilling to give up its nuclear arsenal because it lacks security assurances from its opponents, and national security is highly prioritised on its list and is something it is unwilling to trade for economic progress. However the North can be seen as being forced to make a choice as its economy is being further pressurised and isolated from international trade for guarding its sovereignty, hence nuclear tests are launched in desperation.

4.4 Evaluation of Possible Approaches

Through the two perspectives that this research paper has analysed, it is therefore proven that it is to both countries advantage to make use of a non-aggressive means to solve the issue. As an

economically developed country and one with networks and ties with many other countries, South Korea would have an interest to make use of these methods in order to reduce the threat to its national interests, such as its regional security which would impact its economy. On the other hand, North Korea has reacted aggressively to hostile conditional engagement employed by the ROK and the US, and has clearly rejected the use of economic sanctions. The harsher military approach would see a retaliation from the North seeing that it has already mobilised its nuclear arsenal when less harsh approaches like economic sanctions have been used. Consistency and sincerity should also be practised in engagement, seeing that broken promises aggravated relations between the two. Thus, it is evident that unconditional diplomacy is the best way forward to solve the issue for both stakeholders.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

The Korean Conflict has been characterised by a volatile interchange between diplomacy and antagonism, which persists on today. Relations between North Korea and the rest of the world seems to be developing in a positive way now. Just like the period of time when the Sunshine Policy was implemented, summits and negotiations are unfolding. The Third Inter-Korean Summit in April 2018 succeeded the high-level talks between the two Koreas during the Sunshine Policy Era. The Trump-Kim Summit in June 2018 has become a milestone and marks a possible start of the normalisation of relations between the DPRK and the US. With North Korea reducing the intensity of its rhetoric, it has shown a possible silver lining by approaching the conflict diplomatically. However, policymakers should consider the extent and method diplomacy is being employed; a give-and-take strategy will accommodate the interests of both parties better than an approach of conditional diplomacy, which has received backlash from North Korea in history. One must bear in mind South Korea's interests in the Korean Conflict by relooking at the intentions of the Sunshine Policy in a realist view, but also not forget what ended it. North Korea's national interests must be viewed equally as important in order to form a policy that will successfully motivate behavioural change, and resolve the Korean Conflict.

References

1. Korean crisis: The view from South Korea. (2017, December 01). Retrieved from <https://www.greenleft.org.au/content/korean-crisis-view-south-korea>
2. Marshall, T. (2013, April 04). Korea: A History Of The North-South Split. Retrieved from <https://news.sky.com/story/korea-a-history-of-the-north-south-split-10449691>
3. J. (2016, October 02). Korean War | 3 Minute History. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n-yRq8ewm_k
4. Stueck, W. (n.d.). Revisionism and the Korean War. Retrieved from <https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/365/576>
5. No Longer Forgotten: North Korea-South Korea Relations Since the Korean War. (2001, December) Retrieved from [https://web.stanford.edu/class/e297a/North_Kores- South Kores Relations Since the Korean War.htm](https://web.stanford.edu/class/e297a/North_Kores-_South_Kores_Relations_Since_the_Korean_War.htm)
6. Armstrong, C. K. (2016, January 07). Diplomacy alone will defuse North Korea. The US must lead the way | Charles K Armstrong. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jan/07/diplomacy-alone-defuse-north-korea-us-must-lead-way>
7. Revere, E. J. (2017, February 01). Dealing with a nuclear-armed North Korea. Retrieved from <https://www.brookings.edu/research/dealing-with-a-nuclear-armed-north-korea/>
8. Chandran, N. (2018, March 27). Sanctions could actually end up helping North Korea's economy in the long run. Retrieved from <https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/26/how-sanctions-can-produce-reforms-in-north-korea.html>
9. Cha, V. (2017, March 29). Five Theories of Korean Unification - Beyond Parallel. Retrieved from <https://beyondparallel.csis.org/5-theories-of-unification/>
10. Lockhart-Jackson, V. (2013, September 24). Realism and Liberalism: United States vs. North & South Kore. Retrieved from <https://prezi.com/hbwtiyph-te-m/realism-and-liberalism-united-states-vs-north-south-kore/>
11. MooreConnor, ~. (2015, September 21). Dealing with North Korea from a Liberal Perspective. Retrieved from

<https://internationalrelations4.wordpress.com/2015/09/21/dealing-with-north-korea-from-a-liberal-perspective/>

12. Fraser, P. (2010, March 18). Reconciling Realism: DPRK-ROK Co-operation and IR Implications. Retrieved from <http://www.e-ir.info/2010/03/18/reconciling-realism-dprk-rok-co-operation-and-ir-implications/>
13. Park, Y. (n.d.) South and North Korea's Views on the Unification of the Korean Peninsula and Inter-Korean Relations
14. Understanding the China-North Korea Relationship. (n.d.). Retrieved from <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship>
15. Warden, J.K. (March, 2017). North Korea's nuclear posture: An Evolving challenge for U.S deterrence. Retrieved from https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/warden_north_korea_nuclear_posture_2017.pdf
16. National Research Council. (2000). International Conflict Resolution since the Cold War. Retrieved from <https://www.nap.edu/read/9897/chapter/2>
17. Kang.D.C. (2003). International Relations Theory and the Second Korean War. Retrieved from <https://www.comw.org/qdr/fulltext/03Kang.pdf>
18. H., Mochizuki, M., & Hanlon, M. O. (2016, July 28). Economic Reform and Military Downsizing: A Key to Solving the North Korean Nuclear Crisis? Retrieved from <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/economic-reform-and-military-downsizing-a-key-to-solving-the-north-korean-nuclear-crisis/>
19. Fleitz, F. (2017, December 01). Time for limited US military action against North Korea. Retrieved from <http://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/362722-time-for-limited-us-military-action-against-north-korea>
20. Rovere, C., Babones, S., Li, H., & Kelly, R. E. (n.d.). The Case for War with North Korea. Retrieved from <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-case-war-north-korea-21500?page=3>

21. Vitkovskaya, J. (2017, September 28). What does North Korea want? Retrieved from
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/09/28/what-does-north-korea-want/?utm_term=.22bbea489619
22. Vavra, S. (2017, September 24). What North Korea wants from the U.S. Retrieved from
<https://wwwaxios.com/what-north-korea-wants-from-the-us-1513305693-3b88ad94-e55c-4baa-855b-da689d65ddfc.html>
23. Nations' Reaction to DPRK's NPT Withdrawal. (n.d.). Retrieved from
<http://www.china.org.cn/english/international/53298.htm>
24. P. (2016, October 13). MORGENTHAU'S SIX PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL REALISM. Retrieved from
<https://politicsmania.wordpress.com/2016/10/13/morgenthau-s-six-principles-of-political-realism/>
25. T. (2018, June 12). I Escaped North Korea. Here's My Message for President Trump. | NYT - Opinion. Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HVPjoEN1a8k>
26. Choon, C. M. (2018, June 11). Trump-Kim summit: South Korea's Moon Jae In hopes for bold decisions and miraculous result. Retrieved from
<https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/singapore-summit-south-koreas-moon-hopes-for-bold-decisions-and-miraculous-result>
27. South Korea:. (2001, February 12). Retrieved from
<https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL30188.html>
28. Stratfor. (2000, March 26). Sunset for South Korea's Sunshine Policy? Retrieved from
<https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/sunset-south-koreas-sunshine-policy>
29. The Sunshine Policy of South Korea. (n.d.). Retrieved from
<http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2017/ph241/min2/>
30. Weissmann, J. (2011, December 21). How Kim Jong Il Starved North Korea. Retrieved from
<https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/12/how-kim-jong-il-starved-north-korea/250244/>

31. Haynes, S. (2018, June 08). Trump-Kim Summit: Where, When and What Will They Discuss? Retrieved from
<http://time.com/5305550/donald-trump-north-korea-kim-jong-un-singapore-summit-what-to-know/>
32. Choon, C. M. (2018, June 12). Trump-Kim summit: Jubilant Moon Jae In pledges to write 'new history' with North Korea. Retrieved from
<https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/trump-kim-summit-sleepless-skorea-president-moon-jae-in-hopes-for-new-era-of-complete>
33. Cohen, Z. (2018). CIA warns Kim Jong Un could use nukes as 'coercive' tool. Retrieved from
<https://edition.cnn.com/2018/01/23/politics/cia-director-pompeo-north-korea/index.html>
34. Kim, J., & Kiyoshi, T. (2018). North Korea threatens to 'sink' Japan, reduce U.S. to 'ashes and...'. Retrieved from
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles/north-korea-threatens-to-sink-japan-reduce-u-s-to-ashes-and-darkness-idUSKCN1BP0F3>
35. George, A. L. (1991). *Forceful persuasion: Coercive diplomacy as an alternative to war*. Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press.
36. Carpenter, T. (2010). Plan B for dealing with North Korea. *Policy: A Journal Of Public Policy And Ideas*, Vol. 26(2), 14-18.
37. Luttwak, E. (2018). It's Time to Bomb North Korea. Retrieved from
<https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/08/its-time-to-bomb-north-korea/>
38. Lam, D. (2018). The case for using military force against North Korea. Retrieved from
<https://theconversation.com/the-case-for-using-military-force-against-north-korea-89747>
39. Metz, S. (2017). Why Military Action Against North Korea Is the Worst Option—and Possibly Necessary. Retrieved from
<https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/21543/why-military-action-against-north-korea-is-the-worst-option-and-possibly-necessary>
40. The Cost of Intervention. (2018). Retrieved from
<https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/cost-intervention>

41. Stanton, J., & Lee, S. (2016). North Korea: How to get serious with it. Retrieved from
<https://archive.fo/20170118154609/http://edition.cnn.com/2016/01/15/opinions/lee-stanton-north-korea-sanctions/>
42. Asada, M. (2011). A Solution in Sanctions: Curbing Nuclear Proliferation in North Korea.
Harvard International Review, Vol. 32(4), 18-21.
43. Whitty, M., Kim, S., & Crick, T. (2006). The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions: The Case of North Korea. *North Korean Review*, 2(1), 50-65. Retrieved from
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/43908677>
44. Kim, S., & Martin-Hermosillo, M. (2013). The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions Against a Nuclear North Korea. *North Korean Review*, 9(2), 99-110. Retrieved from
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/43908923>
45. Cha, V. (1999). The Rationale for "Enhanced" Engagement of North Korea: After the Perry Policy Review. *Asian Survey*, 39(6), 845-866. doi:10.2307/3021142
46. Sigal, L. (1997). The North Korean Nuclear Crisis: Understanding The Failure of the 'Crime-and-Punishment' Strategy. *Arms Control Today*, 27(3), 3-13. Retrieved from
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/23625825>
47. Sigal, L. (1997). Who Is Fighting Peace in Korea?: An Undiplomatic History. *World Policy Journal*, 14(2), 44-58. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40209530>
48. Perry, W. (2018). Diplomacy is the Solution. Retrieved from
<https://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2017-08-15/north-koreas-nuclear-ambition-can-be-stopped-with-diplomacy>
49. Sun-Won, P. (2009). North Korea's Third Attempt to Launch a Long Range Missile and the Last Opportunity to Prevent It [Ebook]. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution: Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies. Retrieved from
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/03_north_korea_park.pdf
50. SIPRI. (2009). North Korea's Nuclear Test Explosion, 2009. SIPRI. Retrieved from
<https://www.sipri.org>
51. Moon, C. (2011). Between Principle and Pragmatism: What Went Wrong with the Lee Myung-bak Government's North Korean Policy?. *Journal Of International And Area Studies*, 18(2), 1-22.

52. Paik, Haksoon. "ASSESSMENT OF THE SUNSHINE POLICY: A KOREAN PERSPECTIVE." *Asian Perspective*, vol. 26, no. 3, 2002, pp. 13–35. JSTOR, JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/42704372.
53. Gard, R. (2018). 'Strategic Patience' with North Korea. Retrieved from <https://thediplomat.com/2013/11/strategic-patience-with-north-korea/>